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Sentinel hospital surveillance was instituted in Australia to detect the presence of pandemic 
group A Streptococcus strains causing scarlet fever. Genomic and phylogenetic analyses 
indicated the presence of an Australian GAS emm12 scarlet fever isolate related to UK outbreak 

















Epidemic scarlet fever caused by the Gram-positive bacterial pathogen Streptococcus pyogenes 
(group A Streptococcus; GAS) resulted in significant childhood disease in the 19th and early 20th 
centuries, gradually abating in parallel with improved living conditions, enhanced standards of 
care, and the advent of antibiotics. By the beginning of this millennium, scarlet fever was 
considered a disease of negligible concern [1]. From 2011, epidemic scarlet fever has been 
reported in Hong Kong [2, 3], mainland China [4, 5] and in the United Kingdom since 2014 [6-8] 
(Figure S1). GAS isolates from these outbreaks have been multiclonal, encompassing several 
GAS emm types including emm1, emm12 (UK, Hong Kong, mainland China), emm3 and emm4 
(UK), and frequently encoding superantigens SpeA, SpeC and SSA. Scarlet fever is a notifiable 
disease in Hong Kong, mainland China and the UK. However, many national public health 
systems, including that of Australia, do not require scarlet fever case notification, making global 
tracking of epidemic strains intrinsically difficult. In 2016 we established a sentinel hospital 
surveillance (described in Supplementary Information) to monitor the importation of GAS 
isolates causing epidemic scarlet fever into Australia. GAS isolates from eight confirmed cases of 
scarlet fever (between 2016 and 2017) were selected for further analysis (Figure S2, 
Supplementary Table 1; Supplementary Information). The GAS emm sequence type was 
determined and isolates were screened by PCR for the presence of genes encoding 
superantigens ssa, speC, speA, and the erythromycin resistance gene ermB (recently associated 
with scarlet fever isolates from Hong Kong and mainland China) (described in Supplementary 
Information). This preliminary PCR analysis identified the atypical presence of the ssa gene [9] 
in an Australian emm12 GAS isolate designated SP1336 causing scarlet fever (Figure S2C, 














The complete genome sequence of SP1336 was determined using a multi-platform approach 
incorporating sequence data derived from short read (Illumina), long read (Pacific Bioscience 
and Oxford Nanopore) and PCR-derived capillary sequencing. This approach (described in 
Supplementary Information) resolved ambiguity within the SP1336 genome due to the presence 
of multiple related prophages that affected the provisional genome assembly. After several 
rounds of assembly validation, we determined that SP1336 contained a 1,878,827 base pair 
circular genome (Figure 1, Genbank accession number CP031738).  
 
Phylogenetic analysis of the 248 emm12 genomes relative to benchmark Hong Kong scarlet 
fever isolate HKU16 [2] revealed general geographical segregation of scarlet fever isolates from 
Hong Kong and mainland China, and the UK as reported previously (Figure 1C) [4]. SP1336 
shared a close evolutionary relationship (17 core genome SNPs) to a sub-clade of isolates from 
the UK that included clinical scarlet fever isolates. This clade did not share a recent evolutionary 
history with two other Australian emm12 strains isolated from non-scarlet fever cases in the 
1990s, indicating that they have evolved independently. Instead, these data suggest an 
evolutionary relationship between scarlet fever cases in the UK and this scarlet fever isolate 
from Australia. 
 
One of the defining clinical features of scarlet fever is the cutaneous rash believed to be driven 
by potent immunostimulatory toxins such as the GAS streptococcal pyogenic exotoxins. The 
emergence of major scarlet fever clades in China has been linked to the acquisition of SSA, SpeC 
and Spd1 encoded prophages [3]. Analysis of the prophage content of the SP1336 genome 
revealed four prophage elements designated SP1336.1 (harboring the exotoxin SpeC and the 
DNase, Spd1); SP1336.2 (toxins SpeH and SpeI); SP1336.3 (superantigen SSA); and 













found in the ongoing scarlet fever outbreaks in the UK, Hong Kong and mainland China [3, 4]. 
Comparative analyses of the SP1336.3 and other ssa-harboring prophages from Hong Kong 
and mainland China, showed that SP1336.3 is ~95% identical at the nucleotide level to the ssa 
prophage HKU.ssa from the Hong Kong scarlet fever strain HKU360 (Figure 1B) [3]. 
SP1336.3 also shared a high degree of synteny with SP1336.1 (~90%), itself ~99% 
nucleotide identity to prophage MGAS10750.1 from a US pharyngitis patient (Figure 1B) [10]. 
No multidrug resistance genes or transposable elements were identified in the SP1336 isolate, 
commensurate with the evolutionary-related emm12 UK lineage. 
 
Scarlet fever cases have risen in multiple countries since 2011 (Figure S1) [2-8]. Rather than 
subsiding, case numbers of scarlet fever have again significantly increased in recent years both 
in Hong Kong (Figure S1A) and the UK [11]. The burden of this outbreak on healthcare services 
is substantial with hospital admissions from scarlet fever increasing threefold from baseline at 
the peak of the outbreak [8]. We have become increasingly concerned about the spread of 
scarlet fever-inducing GAS to countries where this disease is not notifiable, and thus instigated 
our own localized notification system in Australia. Here we report the detection of an emm12 
GAS strain in Australia that harbors scarlet fever-associated phage-like elements [3, 4] and 
shares a recent common ancestor to a cluster of scarlet fever isolates from the UK. The 
presented data highlight the dynamic nature of toxin-harbouring prophages within poly-
lysogenic GAS genomes. Furthermore, the maintenance of distinct virulence gene sets (SSA, 
SpeC, Spd1, SpeH, SpeI) suggests a positive selection for particular toxin combinations within 
the current scarlet fever pandemic. 
 
Outbreaks of scarlet fever in the UK, Hong Kong and mainland China have been characterized as 













scarlet fever isolates are distantly related, these geographically discrete strains have evolved 
independently into distinct clades [3, 4], excluding the worldwide spread of a single emm12 
scarlet fever clone. GAS superantigens SpeA, SpeC and SSA have been associated with scarlet 
fever isolates in several studies, but this association is not universal [2-4, 6]. The underlying 
cause of disease resurgence remains unknown. Immune status changes in the human population 
resulting in increased susceptibility to infection, introduction of genetic elements encoding 
superantigens into the GAS population, co-infection with an unknown agent that predisposes 
the host to scarlet fever and environmental change have all been proposed as possible triggers 
for the observed resurgence in disease [12]. While a single dominant strain fails to explain the 
recent international upsurge in scarlet fever, the distant identification of a strain associated 
with the UK outbreak may herald similar outbreaks elsewhere. In national health systems 
where scarlet fever is not notifiable, sentinel hospital surveillance of the type used in this study 
to rapidly identify and monitor the dissemination of GAS isolates causing epidemic scarlet fever 
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Figure 1. Population genomics of the Australia scarlet fever strain SP1336. (A) Genome ring of 
the SP1336 emm12 GAS genome showing (from inner ring); GC skew, GC plot, position and 
name of prophage elements (red blocks), and location and orientation of coding sequences. (B) 
Genomic organization of SP1336.3 and SP1336.1 relative to their closest genetic relatives; 
HKU.ssa (from an emm12 Hong Kong scarlet fever strain HKU360 [3]) and MGAS10750 
(from an emm4 pharyngitis isolate from the USA [10]) respectively. Nucleotide sequence 
diversity is scaled from 100% (black) to 80% (yellow). (C) Midpoint-rooted maximum-
likelihood phylogenetic tree of 248 emm12 GAS strains built on 2,633 polymorphic sites within 
the non-recombinogenic core genome relative to the HKU16 reference isolate [2]. Clinical 
association and country of isolation is displayed next to the tree in addition to the relative 
distribution of selected virulence genes, and antimicrobial resistance genes and ssa carrying 
prophages (HKU.vir [2]), HKU.ssa [3] and SP1336.3) within the emm12 population (black 
shading refers to gene carriage). Phylogenetic branch relating to the Australian scarlet fever 
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